Coastal ecosystems are increasingly dominated by humans. Consequently, the human dimensions of sustainability science have become an integral part of emerging coastal governance and management practices. But if we are to avoid the harsh lessons of land management, coastal decision makers must recognize that humans are one of the more coastally dependent species in the biosphere. Management responses must therefore confront both the temporal urgency and the very real compromises and sacrifices that will be necessary to achieve a sustainable coastal (...) ecosystem, one that is economically feasible, socially just, and ecologically sound. (shrink)

The volume documents, and makes an original contribution to, an astonishing period in twentieth-century philosophy—the progress of Arne Naess's ecophilosophy from its inception to the present. It includes Naess's most crucial polemics with leading thinkers, drawn from sources as diverse as scholarly articles, correspondence, TV interviews and unpublished exchanges. The book testifies to the skeptical and self-correcting aspects of Naess's vision, which has deepened and broadened to include third world and feminist perspectives. Philosophical Dialogues is an essential addition to the (...) literature on environmental philosophy. (shrink)

Aldo Leopold studied the Bible not for devotional but for rhetorical purposes. At the beginning of “Some Fundamentals of Conservation in the Southwest” (written in 1923) Leopold quotes Ezekiel’s criticism of land and water mismanagement and infers from it three moral rationales for conservation: (1) (a) personal, (b) professional, and (c) societal _virtue_; (2) responsibility to _future generations_, both to (a) “immediate posterity” and (b) the “Unknown Future”; and (3) _respect_ for the earth as a living being. Leopold elaborates the (...) idea of the Earth as a living being and speculates on the possibility of its “soul or consciousness” inspired by P. D. Ouspensky’s _Tertium Organum_. Leopold thus anticipates the Gaia Hypothesis. He ridicules metaphysical anthropocentrism and A. T. Hadley’s definition of _truth_ as “that which prevails in the long run.” Bryan Norton argues that Leopold is endorsing Hadley’s definition, but fails to appreciate Leopold’s irony in mentioning it. (shrink)

One aspect of J. Baird Callicott’s foundational project for ecocentrism consists in explaining how moral consideration for ecological wholes can be grounded in moral sentiments. Some critics of Callicott have objected that moral consideration for ecological wholes is impossible under a sentimentalist conception of ethics because, on both Hume and Smith’s views, sympathy is our main moral sentiment and it cannot be elicited by holistic entities. This conclusion is premature. The relevant question is not whether such moral consideration is (...) compatible with the moral psychologies elaborated by Hume and Smith themselves, but, rather, whether it is possible given the moral psychology human beings actually possess. To answer this question, we must turn to empirical moral psychology and consider the possibility of a sentimentalist ecocentrism based on the community, autonomy, diversity model, a very promising model of human moral psychology developed by psychologists Richard Shweder, Paul Rozin, and Jonathan Haidt. This model can be used to assess the possibility of grounding ecocentrism in human moral sentiments. In light of this assessment, ecocentrism should be understood as a new form of naturalistic ethics informed by the moral emotions of disgust, shame, awe, and wonder. (shrink)

In a series of papers, J. Baird Callicott criticizes the wilderness concept of nature and the associated approach to environmentalism which focuses on the preservation of areas of land free of human intervention. As he notes, this concept rests on a human/nature dualism which defines the natural in opposition to the cultural and the artefactual, and thus in principle places humans outside the natural realm. This makes it conceptually impossible for humans to intervene in nature without denaturing it. Callicott (...) rejects this concept of naturalness for two general kinds of reasons. First, because it is socio-politically oppressive, as it is frequently applied to areas where some aboriginal... (shrink)

Dans cet article, je présenterai la stratégie adoptée par J. B. Callicott pour ancrer l’écocentrisme dans les sciences biologiques et écologiques tout en restant en accord avec la méta-éthique humienne selon laquelle on ne peut directement inférer un jugement portant sur le devoir-être à partir d'un jugement portant sur l'être. Je le ferai en rappelant d’abord quelques caractéristiques importantes de la méta-éthique humienne quant à la relation entre la raison, les émotions et les jugements de valeur. Je montrerai ensuite comment (...) cette méta-éthique, revisitée en relation avec l’explication évolutionnaire de l’éthique, permet de concevoir l’écocentrisme comme une évolution morale. Finalement, ces caractérisations méta-éthiques me permettront de montrer comment Callicott parvient à justifier la supériorité de l’écocentrisme sur les conceptions rivales en s'appuyant sur des considérations scientifiques, mais sans toutefois commettre le sophisme humien consistant à inférer directement des jugements portant sur le devoir-être à partir de jugements portant sur l'être. (shrink)

A good argument is one whose conclusions follow from its premises; its conclusions are consequences of its premises. But in what sense do conclusions follow from premises? What is it for a conclusion to be a consequence of premises? Those questions, in many respects, are at the heart of logic (as a philosophical discipline). Consider the following argument: 1. If we charge high fees for university, only the rich will enroll. We charge high fees for university. Therefore, only the rich (...) will enroll. There are many different things one can say about this argument, but many agree that if we do not equivocate (if the terms mean the same thing in the premises and the conclusion) then the argument is valid, that is, the conclusion follows deductively from the premises. This does not mean that the conclusion is true. Perhaps the premises are not true. However, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is also true, as a matter of logic. This entry is about the relation between premises and conclusions in valid arguments. (shrink)

Liberty is what libertarians advocate. Both because of the inherent value of human liberty and because of the increasing wealth and welfare it brings to all. They see the aggressive coercion of the state as the main enemy of liberty. The solution is to roll back the state until there is little or no state left. Libertarianism has been rapidly growing since the 1970s. But it is still not commonly understood or even given a proper hearing. However, you will increasingly (...) come across it. Often it will be through state enthusiasts disingenuously claiming to be libertarians . At other times it will be through state enthusiasts attacking libertarianism as an extremist ideology. And very occasionally it will be real libertarians explaining and defending their views. J C Lester is a libertarian philosopher who has been writing about why liberty is preferable to politics for many years. This book contains many of his shorter writings on the subject. These range from the populist to the philosophical. Together they function as a miscellaneous introduction to libertarianism. The various different topics and approaches should give the reader a good cross-reference grasp of the subject. (shrink)

In this paper I shall give a solution of the decision problem for the Lewis systems S2 and S4; i.e., I shall establish a constructive method for deciding whether an arbitrary given sentence of one of these systems is provable. The method is laborious to apply, since, in order to decide by means of it whether a given sentence is provable, it is necessary to construct a (usually very large) finite matrix. The argument will perhaps be of general interest, however, (...) because it does not seem to depend too closely on the special features of these particular systems, so that it may be possible to apply it in order to solve the decision problem for other such systems.Section II presents the decision method for S2, and Section III for S4. In Section IV, I shall establish a certain correspondence between S4 and topology, which will provide a solution for a decision problem in topology; this correspondence also enables us to settle a previously unsolved problem with regard to the Lewis systems.In treating of this system, I shall use the notation of Lewis, with the single exception that I shall use the symbol “≣”, instead of Lewis's symbol “=”, for strict equivalence. I shall use the symbol “=” to denote identity. Thus “p≣q” is a formula of S2, while “x=y” is the statement asserting that x and y are identical. I shall refer to the rules, primitive sentences and theorems of S2 by the names and numbers used by Lewis. Whenever a theorem stated by Lewis involves the symbol “=”, I shall of course suppose that this symbol has been replaced throughout by “≣”: thus, for example, I shall take 19.82 to be “(◇p∨◇q) ≣ ◇(p∨q)”, instead of “(◇p∨◇q) ≣ ◇(p∨q)”. (shrink)

The Orpheus Hypothesis I (Graziano, 2026) established rhythm as the ontological ground of musical experience, while the T.I.C.A. model formalized the indeterminacy of temporal coupling between dynamical systems. These findings, taken together, generate a consequence that their authors did not anticipate — or perhaps anticipated too clearly to state without preparation. They collide, with considerable force, against a fundamental historiographical anomaly: the alleged teleological acceleration of Western music. The history of a phenomenon that is, at its ontological core, an embodied, (...) indeterminate, non-linear event cannot itself be a linear, necessary, and progressive sequence. Something is wrong with the story we have been told. This paper proposes that the 'Western Canon' is not an organic evolutionary process but a twentieth-century simulation — a project of Temporal Engineering — and that the history of music was synchronized at the dawn of the phonographic era to facilitate mass temporal entrainment on an unprecedented scale. If the Orpheus Hypothesis is correct, music history is a retroactive deepfake designed to replace biological resonance with industrial synchronization. The paper proceeds in five movements, each of which removes one load-bearing pillar from the edifice of musical historiography, and concludes by proposing the Orpheus Hypothesis not merely as a theoretical framework but as an instrument of diagnosis — and, for those who choose to use it as such, of liberation. (shrink)

The Orpheus Hypothesis I (Graziano, 2026) established that rhythm — understood as the embodied temporal structure of musical experience — is the ontological ground of musical meaning. That paper identified a foundational limit in the formalist paradigm: its systematic inability to account for the conditions under which music becomes possible as experience. The present paper provides what the Orpheus Hypothesis explicitly deferred: a rigorous formal grounding. We argue that rhythmic indeterminacy is not an epistemological deficiency — a gap in our (...) measurement — but a structural feature inscribed in the logic of embodied temporal interaction itself. To show this, we construct a framework we call the T.I.C.A. model (Temporal Integration of Coupled Attractors), which reinterprets a prior formal system — originally developed in a deliberately playful key and presented here as a heuristic source rather than as formal warrant — as a category-theoretic account of dynamic coupling between temporal state-systems. The model’s central operator is the Temporal Functor H¹: an asymmetric, structure-preserving map that formalizes the moment at which two rhythmically organized systems achieve genuine temporal coupling. We argue that the eleven combinators of the T.I.C.A. system behave as endofunctors on the category of interaction states, and that at least one identifiable proper subfamily of these combinators fails to commute, generating a non-distributive lattice of temporal propositions that is structurally analogous to — though we do not claim identity with — the Birkhoff–von Neumann lattice of quantum logic. The paper concludes by engaging Lydia Goehr’s concept of the ‘imaginary museum of musical works,’ arguing that the Temporal Functor provides the formal mechanism that liberates the musical event from museum-like stasis and restores it to the flux of orphic, embodied interaction that is its proper ontological condition. (shrink)

The preceding papers of this project established, respectively, the ontological and the logical foundations of a philosophy of music grounded in embodied rhythm. The Orpheus Hypothesis argued that rhythm is ontologically prior to musical meaning; the T.I.C.A. model demonstrated that rhythmic indeterminacy is a structural necessity inscribed in the non-commutative algebra of temporal coupling. The present paper supplies its phenomenological dimension — the account of what it is like to be a body in time. We introduce the concept of Or-Rhythm (...) (Rhythm-Or): the originary temporal matrix that precedes, and makes possible, the distinction between subject and object, between listener and sound-event. We argue that the dominant neuroscientific framework for understanding musical rhythm — predictive processing, in its Vuustian articulation — while technically powerful, commits a philosophical error of the first order: it reconstructs the body as a problem-solving engine and rhythm as the material over which that engine ranges, thereby reproducing, in the language of computational neuroscience, the very dualism that the Orpheus Hypothesis set out to dissolve. Against this, we propose the figure of the Orphic Body: a body that does not predict time but resonates within it — an organism whose nervous system functions not as a computational device but as an organ of coupling, attuned to environmental temporal attractors through a dynamic that is constitutively non-algorithmic. We connect this phenomenological claim to the political philosophy of Hartmut Rosa, arguing that the Temporal Functor Hypothesis provides the formal structure for which Rosa's concept of Resonance has been waiting — and that the recovery of Or-Rhythm is not merely a philosophical achievement but an irreducibly political act. (shrink)

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The first sentence in this essay is a lie. There is something odd about saying so, as has been known since ancient times. To see why, remember that all lies are untrue. Is the first sentence true? If it is, then it is a lie, and so it is not true. Conversely, suppose that it is not true. As we (viz., the authors) have said it, presumably with the intention of you believing it when it is not true, it is (...) a lie. But then it is true! (shrink)

J.C.D. Clark demythologizes the history of Thomas Paine, understanding the impact he has had on modern human rights, democracy, and internationalism.

We are pluralists about logical consequence [1]. We hold that there is more than one sense in which arguments may be deductively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally deserving of the name deductive validity. Our pluralism starts with our analysis of consequence. This analysis of consequence is not idiosyncratic. We agree with Richard Jeffrey, and with many other philosophers of logic about how logical consequence is to be defined. To quote Jeffrey.

I have argued that without an adequate solution to the knower paradox Fitch's Proof is- or at least ought to be-ineffective against verificationism. Of course, in order to follow my suggestion verificationists must maintain that there is currently no adequate solution to the knower paradox, and that the paradox continues to provide prima facie evidence of inconsistent knowledge. By my lights, any glimpse at the literature on paradoxes offers strong support for the first thesis, and any honest, non-dogmatic reflection on (...) the knower paradox provides strong support for the second. Whether verificationists want to go the route I've suggested is not for me todecide. As in the previous section my aim has been that of defending the mere viability of verificationism in the face of what many, many philosophers have taken to be its death-knell, namely Fitch's Proof. But, as the final objection makes clear, showing that verificationism can live in the face of Fitch's Proof is one thing; showing that it should live is another project. If nothing else, I hope that this papershows that verificationists still have a project to pursue; Fitch's Proof, contrary to popular opinion, need not bury verificationism.13. (shrink)

J C Walker; The Philosopher’s Touchstone: towards pragmatic unity in educational studies, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, P.

This volume contains an annotated reprint of Wittgenstein's "Zeitungsartikel und Vorträge", edited by J. C. Nyíri. The writings are preceded by an extensive introduction by J. C. Nyíri and Brian McGuinness. English summaries and notes have been provided by Barry Smith.

The Aristotle-Kant tradition requires that autonomous activity must originate within the self and points toward a new type of causation (different from natural efficient causation) associated with teleology. Notoriously, it has so far proven impossible to uncover a workable model of causation satisfying these requirements without an increasingly unsatisfying appeal to extra-physical elements tailor-made for the purpose. In this paper we first provide the essential reason why the standard linear model of efficient causation cannot support the required model of agency: (...) its causal thread model of efficient causation cannot support the core requirement that an action is determined by, and thus an expression of, the agent’s nature. We then provide a model that corrects these deficiencies, constructed naturalistically from within contemporary biology, and argue that it provides an appropriate foundation for all the features of genuine agency. Further, we provide general characterisations of freedom and reason suitable to this bio-context (but that also capture the core classical conceptions) and show how this model reconciles them. (shrink)

In this paper we continue the study of inner models of the type studied inInner models for set theory—Part I.The present paper is concerned exclusively with a particular kind of model, the ‘super-complete models’ defined in section 2.4 of I. The condition of 2.4 and the completeness condition 1.42 imply that such a model is uniquely determined when its universal class Vmis given. Writing condition and the completeness conditions 1.41, 1.42 in terms of Vm, we may state the definition in (...) the form:3.1. Dfn.A classVmis said to determine a super-complete model if the model whose basic notions are defined by,satisfies axiomsA, B, C.N. B. This definition is not necessarily metamathematical in nature. If desired, it could be written out quite formally as the definition of a notion ‘SCM’ thus:whereψ is the propositional function expressing in terms ofUthe fact that the model determined byUaccording to 3.1 satisfies the relativization of axioms A, B, C. E.g. corresponding to axiom A1m, i.e.,,ψ contains the equivalent term. All the relativized axioms can be similarly expressed in this way by first writing out the relativized form and then replacing ‘ϕ bywhich is in turn replaced by, and similarly replacing ‘ϕ’ by ‘ϕ’ by ‘), andThusψ is obtained in primitive notation. (shrink)